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COURT OF APPEALS, 1958 TERM
shareholders.24
The Court of Appeals reversed.25 It was satisfied that neither the law nor
the terms of the contract obligated the defendant to persuade the corporation
to approve the assignment. It also said that there was no question of the
right of the corporation to exclude the plaintiff, since this action was not
based upon a New York statute which prohibits discrimination in co-operative
housing.26
This case indicates that the duty to use reasonable efforts in seeking ap-
proval in third-party approval contracts may be minimal in New York if
such appears to be the parties' intention. Moreover, the effect of this case
is limited by its procedural setting. The instant case arose on a motion for
a temporary injunction, which would issue only if the plaintiff established a
cause of action for specific performance. Even if there was no reasonable effort
on the part of the lessee to seek approval, the Court could not issue the
injunction, because plaintiff's remedy would be an action at law for damages.
Even by court order an assignment would be ineffectual if the corporation
did not approve. In light of this procedural setting, and because the tenor
of the contract indicated that no obligation to seek approval was intended,
this decision is of minor importance.
STAY OF LEGAL PROCEEDINGS WHERE CONTRACT CALLS FOR ARBITRATION
Section 1450 of the Civil Practice Act 2 7 provides that the court, upon
application of one of the parties, shall order parties to proceed to arbitration
if their contract is established and has provided for that remedy.
Where the' contract provides for arbitration the courts relegate to the
exclusive jurisdiction of arbitration all acts of the parties subsequent to the
making of the contract,2 8 even if the contract was terminated before its
completion by breach29 or otherwise.30 No waiver of the right to arbitrate oc-
curs when a party moves for dismissal of a court action brought by the other
party,31 unless the party assents to the court's jurisdiction and fails to assert
24. The Appellate Division considered an attempt by the defendant to seek approval
by this method, while the case was before it, as immaterial since the issues were formed
at trial.
25. Supra note 22.
26. See, for example N.Y. Cvn RUHTS LAW § 18-a(2), which provides: "The
practice of discrimination because of race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry in
any publicly assisted housing accommodations is hereby declared to be against public
policy."
27. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1450 provides: A party aggrieved by failure ... of another
to perform under a contract . . . providing for arbitration . . . may petition . .. for an
order directing that such arbitration proceed in manner provided for in such contract....
Upon being satisfied that there is no substantial issue as to the making of the contract
. . . or the failure to comply therewith, the court hearing such application shall make an
order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
contract.
28. In re Lipman, 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942).
29. In re Potoker, 2 N.Y.2d 553, 161 N.Y.S.2d 609 (1957).
30. Arbitration between Baker and Bd. of Educ., 309 N.Y. 551, 132 N.E.2d 837 (1956).
31. Haupt v. Rose, 265 N.Y. 108, 191 N.E. 853 (1934).
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his arbitration right in his answer or otherwise.3 2
In Terminal Auxiliar Mari v. Winkler Cr. Corp.83 defendant terminated its
contract with plaintiff due to the latter's supposed breach of the contract.
The contract broadly provided for arbitration of any dispute arising under it.
Plaintiff, believing that defendant breached the contract, brought a court
action and defendant, a foreign corporation, agreed to fully submit to the
court's jurisdiction, such submission to be "without prejudice to the ... remedies
. . . available to the parties," and to "pertain . . . only to the matter of the
jurisdiction of this court and to the posting of security." Shortly thereafter,
defendant sought an order directing arbitration and staying plaintiff's action.
Plaintiff opposed the motion, contending that: (1) no arbitrable issue existed
since defendant had terminated the charter contract, and (2) defendant
waived his right to arbitration by submitting to the court's jurisdiction.
In upholding the granting of the motion by the trial court, the Court
concluded that since the dispute arose under and subsequent to the charter
agreement, the contract's broad arbitration clause brought it within the authority
of Section 1450. They reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to nullify the
broad purpose of the statute, since most issues between parties stem from
supposed breaches by one party or the other. Therefore, the termination of
the contract did not extinguish the parties' right to arbitrate claims accruing
prior thereto. The Court further held that although the defendant had sub-
mitted to the court's jurisdiction, the agreed upon stipulation with the plaintiff
clearly evinced defendant's preservation of its right to compel arbitration.
CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS oF THE PARTIES
In Hempstead Theatre Corp. v. Metropolitan Playhouses Inc., plaintiff
corporation leased its theatres to Metropolitan, Inc., which in turn sublet to
defendant.3 The rent to be paid was a fixed minimum plus a graduated
percentage of gross receipts. The lease stated that these receipts should include,
among others, "all box office receipts, excluding taxes on admissions and all in-
come derived from . . . concessions." The only question involved is whether
the "income" received from the candy concession is to be gross receipts, or
gross receipts less the cost of candy and refreshments sold? Plaintiff brought this
action for rental due, claiming the former interpretation. The Supreme Court
entered judgment for plaintiff, as did the Appellate Division, but the Court
of Appeals reversed in favor of defendants.
Each clause of a contract must be given its intended purpose in the
promotion of the primary and dominant purpose of the contract.35 As to what
the rent should be, the lease stated when referring to the box office that
32. Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 139 N.E. 764 (1923).
33. 6 N.Y.2d 294, 189 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959).
34. Hempstead Theatre Corporation v. Metropolitan Playhouses Inc., 6 N.Y.2d
311, 189 N.Y.S.2d 837 (1959).
- 35. Empire Properties Corporation v. Manufacturers Trust Co., 288 N.Y. 242, 43
N.E.2d 25 (1942).
